2014年4月13日

2014-4-13

One red princeling Hu Shiying posted a photo of a private gathering of China's red princelings, in which a infamous red guard Song Yaowu appeared.

The party was hosted by Xi Jinping, then CCP Party Boss in Zhejiang Province. Others appeared in this photo includes Bo Xicheng (son of Bo Yibo and brother of Bo Xilai), Liu Yuan (son of Liu Shaoqi), Wang Qishan (son in law of Yao Yilin), Yang Li (daughter of Yang Shangkun), Chen Yuan (son of Chen Yun) among others. Song Yaowu is the women 4th from left in the front. Xi Jinping is 3rd from right in the second row.

Song, together with another Red Guard Deng Rong (daughter of Deng Xiaoping), killed their teacher Bian Zhongyun, the first teacher to be killed by students in the Great Cultural Revolution. The incident opened an era when red guards across the country were mobilized to take over schools by violence. Many more teachers would be tortured and killed in the next few years.

One of those from whom Hu Jie got evidence was another teacher at the school, Lin Mang.In the film Lin states that the Red Guards beat Bian Zhongyun in a toilet room. He described one of the perpetrators as a tall, thin girl. Lin also stated in the film that Red Guards forced him to carry Bian's body after her murder.

Based upon subsequent additional credible evidence received,the tall, thin girl who Lin saw beating Bian was Liu Tingting, daughter of Liu Shaoqi, the president of China.

在胡锦涛和温家宝作为新一届领导人，进行执政之初，政府部门就写出一则文章，把这两位，以及新一届政府，塑造成为，跟其他强势集团不同的集团，也即

这新一届政府，因为没有权力，或权力被压制，以及，没有资源，而无法开展更多的工作

而这种手法，甚至运用在了朱镕基执政的那届政府 

十八大以后，李克强和习近平执政，没有人认为习近平是弱势的，但，媒体等，又将李克强塑造成为一个“弱势”形象

最典型的，就数西方媒体发表的新闻，说，李克强在各种高端经济会议中，提出中国不对下滑的经济做出更大的刺激

但是，地方政府，诸如贵州，天津，山东等地，立即在李克强表态以后，就出台了规模高达几万亿甚至是几十万亿的投资计划

现在，我不认为李克强是弱势的

我甚至可以断定，如果人们继续盯住李克强习近平等新一届政府

那么还会出现前一届的富豪总理，前一届清廉总理但富豪总理家人，以及之前几届，控制中国经济命脉的所谓八老家族，以及其家族一直置身事外，但其家族黑幕极多的江泽民等事件

李克强的微刺激计划，也只是延续之前政府的各种经济目标和计划  

而这些政治经济目标，其参与者都是中国的强势集团

中国人，西方人，大可以把李克强等人再打造成为一个新“弱势”集团

但在上述推进其政治经济计划目标时，我相信，李克强家族也会参与其中，分得一杯羹，就跟之前胡锦涛，温家宝，及其他家族分到一杯羹一样！

(2014年4月1日 我在查温家宝家族跟薄熙来家族深度勾结，在生意上有往来的帖子时，与我一墙之隔的另一间房，故意发出声音  

2014年4月8日 我在看习近平重用胡锦涛儿女，将胡锦涛儿子弄到嘉兴政法委任职的新闻时，隔壁又发出奇怪的声音

2014年4月8日 下午 我在查温家宝家族跟安邦集团的邓小平孙女婿家族以及朱镕基家族和江泽民家族的生意往来的信息时，警察上门查户口

2014年4月8日，傍晚 我在看关于六四的新闻，其中查到赵紫阳的时候，隔壁又发出奇怪的声音

2014年4月10日 我在查温家宝的情妇，中国政府中纪委高官马馼的信息时，隔壁又传出奇怪的声音

2014年4月10日 我在查朱镕基家族跟中信系王震家族的生意往来的信息时，隔壁又传出奇怪的声音)

在中南海高层众所周知的一个公开秘密是,吴官正的为官和为人并不像他的名字那样“公正”和“正值”，他在曾经工作过的武汉市，江西省，山东等处，还有最后的中纪委，他都扶植和提携一大批自己的人马，直到现在这批人马还听命于吴

据北京知情人士透露，吴官正这次出书能受到党报和官媒的大肆吹捧，就是中宣部开的绿灯。

吴官正的得意门生，前监察部部长，中纪委副书记，马馼，众所周知，是温家宝的人，实际上马馼当初获得提拔，主要靠的是吴官正。随后吴官正向温家宝推荐马馼，最后，马馼不但变成了温家宝的马仔，而且一直都是吴官正的马仔

据《明镜月刊》披露，当时温家宝内心已在盘算如何抢夺电力这块大蛋糕，当然乐得有人作内应，于是任命刘振亚为国家电网公司筹备组副组长，主管电力改革。一时在电力系统权倾朝野。因为替温家宝收降纳叛做了大量工作，温家宝提拔刘振亚当上国家电网公司副经理，党组书记，中共十七大时又赏他一个中央候补委员的待遇

刘振亚给公众的印象相当模糊，又无比鲜明。一方面，除了标准的官方报道，这位国家电网公司的掌门人机会很少接受媒体采访，偶尔出现在镜头前的他，也不过三言两语，人们仅能从他的外貌以及一口带有浓重乡音的普通话推知，国网老总是山东人

互联网上也有针对刘振亚的举报文章。凯迪网络的一篇文章就指出，执掌山东电力时，刘振亚涉嫌大规模做假账。山东电力在泰山中天门曾有个秘密高级宾馆（东尊山庄），装饰豪华（单是一个进口沙发就高达20万元，这个价钱在96-97年是非常惊人的，知道内情的人都目瞪口呆），里面的漂亮小姐经常更换，刘一进这个宾馆，美女们前呼后拥。别说是一般游客，就是地市级以上的官员入住也要刘亲自批准。97年前后，有人举报这个宾馆，山东有关部门要来查账，刘听到风声，就威胁有关人员：谁除了问题谁负责。然后召集财务人员做假账

该文还称，2005年山东电力学校的前校长王开利的办公室被学校的保安偷窃，被盗部分现金和购物卡，这个保安把其中的部分购物卡送人，保安的朋友又在泰安偷盗作案被抓，就把保安供出，保安就把偷窃王开利的案情交代，说王的保险柜里有几十万现金，他不敢全偷，就从一打一打的钱中各抽取一张，又把保险柜锁好。公安顺藤摸瓜，把王开利的腐败案情揭出，但最后王开利无罪释放，只是被撤销了一切职务。据可靠人士透露：上面有人力保王开利，这个保王开利的最后后台肯定是刘振亚

十八大前，刘振亚获悉中纪委秘密调查刘汝革后，马上找到曾庆红。在曾庆红过问下，秘密调查暂时中止。但上述人士说，调查可能只是表面停止。刘振亚长期以来，不仅向曾庆红，温家宝的家属输送了巨大利益，还向中共政治局的其他高层及家属大送项目，身上挂了太多的地雷

在温家宝的支持下，被称为“另一个三峡”的巨大昂贵工程特高压项目，在刘振亚的主导下终于力排众议，一路绿灯开始启动。2009年首期投资即高达830亿元，成为温营造新电力势力的“新三峡工程”。

知情者对本刊说，前段日子，总理温家宝的夫子张蓓莉找到刘振亚，谈起曾经说好的，让其子温云松的私募基金入股特高压的事。特高压是指交流1000千伏及以上和直流正负800千伏及以上的电压等级。现在世界其他国家都处于概念和研究阶段，而中国已经大干快上，是刘振亚主政国家电网后打出的“王牌”，也是国电构筑“中国智能坚强电网”最核心的基干。

特高压一开始受到了各方阻力，尤其是一批老电力专家，认为特高压破坏了中国原来行之有效的电网结构，将给中国的电力供应带来重大危害。刘振亚为了推行特高压，不停地向温家宝示好，并且将一些重大项目交给温夫人的亲信或家属，并承诺项目一旦上马，一些重大项目的安排将积极徵求总理和夫人的意见，终于得到了温夫人和总理的首肯。在总理的支持下，特高压最终力排众议，全线上马。


特高压在试验阶段即投入过千亿，“十二五”期间初步计划投资5000亿，这个巨大的蛋糕，被称为远超“中国高铁规划”的另一个巨大蛋糕，自然引来各方利益集团。现在温夫人提出来，不过是事成收穫，要刘振亚履行承诺而已。


安邦有两大背景：

上海汽车是江泽民家的私产，安邦财险，由上海汽车集团出资，联合朱镕基儿子朱云来等人作为股东，上述一起成立，最终安邦投资了中信系王震家的中信证券，以及其他一些项目，参与安邦的还有你们上述一直谩骂，说跟你们不和的温家宝儿子的新天域

据上海汽车工业（集团）总公司总裁、安邦财险董事长胡茂元介绍，安邦财险于2004年6月9日获得中国保监会批准筹建，仅仅经过三个多月的筹备，于同年9月30日获准开业。目前公司已聘请龙永图、刘晓光、朱云来、陈小鲁、吴光辉、刘榕、董一兵、赵虹等8人担任公司的董事。

一是董事长吴小晖是中共元老邓小平的孙女婿。搜狐财经报道：「他的第二任妻子，据悉是改革开放领导人的后代。」相关报道被屏蔽，只因还透露吴小晖外出考察，多是当地一把手亲自接待，「安邦吴小辉的生意对象还包括新天域资本等鼎鼎有名的机构」。新天域资本的创始人是前总理温家宝的公子温云松。

二是中共元帅陈毅之子陈小鲁是安邦大股东。深圳投资界资深人士透露，中国保监会10月25日核准吴小晖任安邦保险董事长、总经理，同时核准陈小鲁任安邦保险董事。陈透过上海标准基础设施投资集团等持有安邦股份，其妻之姪、曾任集团副总经理的粟志军，是解放军已故大将粟裕的孙子，而且在习近平主政浙江时与习颇有交情。

赵紫阳儿媳朱镕基儿女李长春女儿江泽民家族共同承销光大银行

记者了解到，除摩根大通外，另有摩根士丹利、中金公司（朱镕基儿子）、瑞银、法国巴黎银行（这个是赵紫阳儿媳妇所在投行）、中银国际（朱镕基女儿以及李长春子弟所在公司）、海通国际（江泽民系统）和光大证券(8.75, 0.39, 4.67%)国际等7家投行作为光大H股上市的主承销商。

Wuhu officials bypassed the central government for approval of their pioneering plan,turning to the local People’s Congress—China’s answer to a town council—for approval.The city was greatly aided by Chen’s prestige.As Chen and the Wuhu officials saw it,they were creating a virtuous cycle.Public works like roads would boost home prices,which in turn would boost land prices.Higher land prices would mean more local government income,hence more spending.

CDB built Wuhu Construction into a giant;eventually its assets grew from 319 million to 21.4 billion yuan,and it bought equity stakes in 21 local companies, including Chery, which is now using CDB backing to expand into every corner of the developing world,from Africa to Latin America.“From then on,the Wuhu Model was extensively applied across the country,” the bank’s official history says,boosting urbanization,leaving a“precious legacy in the field of financing for urban infrastructure construction.”But what on earth had it started?CDB’slending to local governments did not crowd out other lenders of capital,as some say state-owned development banks can do.Instead,it sucked them all in.The model’ssuccess in Wuhu was replicated across the country,with CDB lending money to LGFVs in Shanghai(home to former president JiangZemin)and Tianjin (home to Premier WenJiabao)as well as the canal city of Suzhou.

One item few prospectuses omit:homage to CDB.Tianjin Binhai Construction and Investment Group,which was set up in 2005 in an agreement between the city and CDB,said it“relied on CDB from the outset.”Huainan Urban Construction Investment Co.in Anhui,which  won a 7.1 billion yuan loan from CDB at the beginning of 2008,said it relied on CDB loans to finance most of its projects.In Jiamusi,an Amur River city near the Russian border in Heilongjiang,a 2010 prospectus  bragged that the local investment company,Jiamusi New Era Infrastructure Construction Investment Group Co.,was“among the top 100 cities that get CDB support.” In the South,on the border with Myanmar,Yunnan Highway Development Investment Co.—more on them later—was created in 2006 through an agreement with CDB.

While Zhu Rongji’s 1994 reforms centralized tax collection,they  perversely allowed local governments greater control over the usage rights of land,allowing them to keep all land-leasing revenues.This growing,valuable state-owned resource was now totally in the hands of local governments,and they had no obligation to publish their budgets to the public.

The inequality in some cases has led to violence,far away from the confines of the state-banking system.That was certainly the case in Fuzhou,a city in JiangxiProvince,just to the east of Hunan.There,a land dispute with the government was central to a May 2011 bombing that killed three  people.Qian Mingqi allegedly set off three blasts at or near government buildings in the city amid a dispute over compensation he had been offered in a resettlement,according to reports by the official Xinhua News Agency.Qian died in one of the explosions. He had been asking for more compensation after being resettled in 2002 to make way for a highway. Three months before the bombings,Fuzhou’s investment vehicle went to the country’s bond market for the first time,raising 800 million  yuan.In its prospectus,in which it said it received CDB loans,the company said its main business included construction,land development,and“resettlement.”

The key was that Tianjin could use 15 years of land usage rights sales to secure the loan,both to act as collateral and as a source to pay back the funds.The city also had to promise to use its own infrastructure fund to pay back the money if land sales ran into difficulties.The bankers forecast that the land sales income would increase every year by 10 percent. That turned out to be a conservative bet:In reality,the income increased by 20 percent.By 2006,land income was 10.3 billion yuan,up from 2.4 billion yuan in 2004.By 2009,it was a different story:China Index Academy estimated the city’s land sales revenue was 73.2 billion yuan,a 67 percent increase over 2008.

While the out break of severe acute respiratory syndrome(SARS) in  2003 in Beijing intervened and prevented Chen Yuan from visiting  Tianjin to sign the deal,it was eventually signed in June of that year.The  original loan contract was signed with the city’s land bank;in 2004, the city set up an LGFV with four subsidiaries to handle the different  projects,including two subway lines,greening of the city,and riverside infrastructure development.The importance of land as collateral acted in the same way that CDB would use oil overseas in Africa and Asia.The  income from the subway,the book notes,only needed to cover operating costs;it doesn’t need to pay back the loan.The money to pay back the loan for all the projects will nearly all come from government income from selling land rights.The investment that CDB started helped bring in the property developers,too:The riverside construction project saw 10 billion yuan of investment in infrastructure but drew a total of 80 or more billion yuan of property construction,according to the book. Yet there’s a point where ambition and enthusiasm becomes recklessness and hubris,and Tianjin may have crossed that line.There’s no better place to witness the physical manifestation of hubris than Yu jiapu, Tianjin’s planned Manhattan.

Xu says the buildings in Yu jiapu are all being occupied by stateowned companies,including a steel company and a mining company turned realestate developer that is putting the finishing touches on Tianjin’s answer to Rockefeller Center.Asked if any private companies were setting up shop there,she pointed to a hotel.A giant billboard in Conch City—red background with white characters—quotes Chinese president Hu Jintao,who visited the area in April 2011,as saying“Put all your strength into storming the fort to win the battle of developing and opening the Binhai NewArea,work hard to become the lead soldiers in the battle to realize scientific development.”Not words you’d find in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. 

To build Yu jiapu,Tianjin officials are piling onto borrowing that was already half a trillion yuan by the end of 2011—equivalent to half the annual per-capita income of the city’s 13 million people.More than 5,000 people were moved out of the area starting in 2008 to make way for the project,among the millions nationwide evicted from homes to make way for China’s urbanization projects.Tianjin  Binhai New Area Construction&Investment Group Co.sold 10 billion yuan worth of bonds in December 2011,earmarking 1 billion yuan from  the sale to fund the construction of the district’s transport hub,which includes a high-speed rail line that will cut travel time to Beijing to 45 minutes.In the first half of that year,its debt,mostly from bank loans and led by CDB,rose 11.9 percent from the end of 2010 to 71 billion yuan, according to a bond prospectus.To finish all the projects,more money is needed,said Tianjin’s vice mayor,Cui Jindu.

CDB’s lending to local governments stems from the failure of Zhu Rongji’s 1994 reforms ,which left local government swith huge spending burdens —everything from providing water to roads—but no  way to raise funds apart from leasing out state land.The prohibition set on borrowing by local governments was a rule observed only in the breach,just pushing the borrowing off the budget and into the arms of the state banks.Without any transparency,and with all of the capital from the state-owned banks rather than private institutions,the market has added no discipline.In one case,a Shanghai LGFV (Local Government Financing Vehicles )borrowed 2 billion yuan of loans for a high-speed railway project,but ended up using half the money for property projects.After the experience of the late 1990s,when many local government and state-owned enterprise loans were bailed out,the commercial banks were supposed to look after themselves,yet many of the projects they piled into led by CDB had poor returns.

There was a fundamental mismatch:The debts and the companies themselves were left off local government balance sheets,even as investors,banks,and ratings companies viewed them as having the implicit guarantee of local governments.Today,the LGFV's (Local Government Financing Vehicles )have dozens of subsidiaries,cross-holdings,and cross-guarantees,making it impossible to tell how much one local government is on the hook for if one linkin the chain is broken.Some LGFVs(Local Government Financing Vehicles ) have also turned into lenders,passing on money to property companies.While China wanted the institutions and infrastructure of a bond market,at the same time as it expanded, banks did their best to hollow out the integrity and effectiveness of those same institutions.Ratings agencies gave bonds sold by local government backed companies high ratings because they believed in the implicit back stop of the local government;investors took the yield as free money.At least the ratings agencies themselves were self-conscious enough to recognize the self-destructive behavior.“Who ever gives them the better rating gets the business,”Dagong’s fiery chairman,Guan Jiangzhong,told us.“This is very dangerous.”

While there is no way of telling what assets CDB was left with,the experience of cities like Chongqing,where GDP growth was16.4percent in 2011,showed that for all its problems,there is sheer genius behind the model.Chen Yuan of CDB had realized in 1998,before other banks, the force of urbanization and its role in economic growth.China long ago decided that the key to GDP growth is boosting productivity,and few economic events boost the productivity of a populace than moving them from life on a farm to life in the city.And that’s exactly what happened in Dawu village to Li Liguang.

The reliance on LGFVs(Local Government Financing Vehicles )  has also created one of the world’s biggest property bubbles:Nation wide,housing prices in China have risen at least by 140 percent since 1998.And unlike the welfare,health,and pension expenses that have crippled Europe,China’s forced urbanization has left a lot of debt before it even begins to deal with these expenses.By 2011, Standard Chartered was predicting that China’s debt levels were in reality around 71 percent of its 2010 GDP,approaching US levels.No one knew how far the debt extended,who else had lent to the companies,and who was liable.There was only one way that China would pay for this debt,and that would be through China’s savers,through higher tax,or through more inflation.